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NOTE
ABSTENTION: AN EXERCISE IN FEDERALISM
INTRODUCTION
Although the doctrine of equitable abstention 1 is a relatively new
concept, its roots are deeply embedded in our constitutional history. Judi-
cially constructed to avoid the premature determination of federal constitu-
tional issues and to minimize federal interference with state domestic policy
and state action, the doctrine found its first authority in the traditional dis-
cretionary powers of an equity court. 2 The existence of two concurrent
sovereignties within the federal system, the peculiar structure of the double
judicial hierarchy, the various bases of federal jurisdiction and the diver-
gences in subject coverage, language, and construction between the various
state constitutions and the federal constitution have provided potential areas
of conflict between federal and state power and complicated the judicial ap-
plication of the maxim that unnecessary constitutional adjudications are to
be avoided. The pattern of increased state regulation of economic and social
life has realized these conflicts and occasioned the need for self-imposed
restraint by the federal courts in order to preserve a balanced system. A
growing reluctance to interfere with state officials in the performance of
their duties and the development of a policy of furthering harmony in
federal-state relations 3 resulted in formulation of the doctrine of abstention
where the prescribed "exceptional circumstances"--those encouraging
I Equitable abstention is one of a number of limitations developed both by
judicial and by legislative action to curb excessive exercise of the federal judicial
power following the Supreme Court's decision in Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
It is somewhat akin to the doctrine of exhaustion of state administrative remedies,
and is "responsive to the same motives" which impelled Congress to require the
convening of a three-judge district court to pass on challenges to state statutes, 28
U.S.C. § 2281 (1952), challenges to the collection of state taxes, 28 U.S.C. § 1341
(1952), and attacks on state rate orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (1952). Its development
closely followed the fashioning of the doctrine that the federal courts would not
enjoin the enforcement of state criminal statutes. Cf. Wright, The Abstention Doc-
trine Reconsidered, 37 TEXAs L. REv. 815 (1959).
2 The leading abstention case is Railroad Comn'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496
(1941), discussed in text accompanying notes 9-22 infra. Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
there discussing the foundation of the doctrine, wrote: "The resources of equity are
equal to an adjustment that will avoid the waste of a tentative decision as well as
the friction of a premature constitutional adjudication. An appeal to the chancellor
. . . is an appeal to the 'exercise of the sound discretion, which guides the deter-
mination of courts of equity'. . . . The history of equity jurisdiction is the history
of regard for public consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of the
injunction." 312 U.S. at 500.
a See Young, Discretion to Deny Federal Relief Against State Action, 28 TEXAS
L. REv. 410 (1950). See also note 1 supra.
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comity or seeming to press toward potentially premature constitutional
decision-were found to be present. Despite earlier unanimity on the
expression of the formula for abstention,4 the Supreme Court, in handing
down five decisions on June 8, 1959, was divided not only on the "applica-
tion" 5 but on the scope of the doctrine as well. In particular, the decision
in Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux 6 requires a re-
examination of past precedent, since the division among the members of the
Court in this case represents basic disagreement on a number of substantial
issues which had heretofore been considered settled.7 It is the purpose of
this Note to ascertain the import of the group of recent decisions, to explore
the issues raised, and to attempt an evaluation of the proper scope of the
abstention doctrine.
HISTORY
Although the Court had had occasion prior to 1941 to restrain the
action of lower federal courts in situations that would now be typified
abstention cases,8 it was not until that year, in the carefully fashioned
opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co.,9 that
the doctrine of equitable abstention received its full expression. The Texas
Railroad Commission, acting under the authority of a Texas statute which
empowered it to "prevent discrimination . . . and any or all other
abuses," 10 adopted an order directing that no Pullman car could be oper-
ated on any Texas railway unless in the charge of a white "conductor."
Asserting diversity as the basis of jurisdiction, the Pullman Company and
its colored porters appeared before a duly constituted three-judge federal
district court challenging the order both as unauthorized under Texas law
and as violative of the due process and equal protection clauses of the
fourteenth amendment, and seeking an injunction prohibiting state officials
4The decision in the Pullman case, 312 U.S. 496 (1941), was 8-0. Justice
Roberts took no part in decision of the case.
5 28 U.S.L. WEzr, 3049 (U.S. Aug. 25, 1959) (Review of Supreme Court's
Work: Jurisdiction and Procedure). This writer apparently regarded the division
in the Court as occasioned merely by a disagreement over "application" of a firmly
established doctrine. Close examination of the cases, however, indicates that the
split has far wider implications. See notes 104-32, 145-74 infra and accompanying text.
6 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
See notes 104-32, 145-74 infra and accompanying text.
8 Decision in the federal district courts had been denied in Thompson v. Magnolia
Petroleum Co., 309 U.S. 478 (1940) (bankruptcy proceedings stayed pending state
court determination of ownership of oil rights under a railroad right of way);
Spielman Motor Co. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89 (1935) (suit to enjoin enforcement of
state criminal statute dismissed); Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U.S. 176 (1935)
(suit by New York resident to force bankruptcy of Pennsylvania savings and loan
company dismissed where state statute provided for special liquidation procedure).
Cf. Hawks v. Hamill, 288 U.S. 52, 61 (1933) ; Gilchrist v. Interborough Transit Co.,
279 U.S. 159 (1929).
9312 U.S. 496 (1941).
10TEx. RIv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6445 (1926).
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from enforcing it. This court, in the absence of state decisions construing
the statutory language, itself determined that the commission lacked author-
ity to promulgate the order, and issued the injunction sought." On direct
appeal, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded with directions to retain
jurisdiction but stay proceedings until such time as the parties could obtain
definitive interpretation of the disputed statute from the Texas courts.
Since the action below was equitable in nature and equity courts had tradi-
tionally retained broad discretionary powers in the exercise of their juris-
diction, there was an historic foundation to support the directed stay of the
proceedings. 12 Furthermore, Justice Frankfurter, speaking for a unanimous
Court, relied on two distinct lines of precedent to reach this result. Penn-
sylvania v. Williams 13 and Spielman Motor Co. v. Dodge 1 4 represented
instances where district courts sitting in equity proceedings had out of
"'scrupulous regard for the rightful independence of the state govern-
ments'" 15 exercised a "'wise discretion' "16 in restraining their authority.
Injunctive relief had been denied in these cases on grounds of the comity
due to state courts and to avoid obstruction of state administrative policy.
On the other hand, Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co.1 7 and Gilchrist v.
Interborough Transit Co.'8 illustrated the type of case where federal courts
had stayed proceedings pending a determination of "unsettled" 19 state law
by the state courts, thus avoiding in whole or in part decision of a federal
constitutional issue when the case in which it was presented might be dis-
posed of on other grounds.2 0  Mr. Justice Frankfurter reasoned that deci-
"1 Pullman Co. v. R.R. Comm'n of Texas, 33 F. Supp. 675 (W.D. Teal. 1940).
12 See note 2 supra.
13294 U.S. 176 (1935).
14295 U.S. 89 (1935).
15 Railroad Comi'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941).
16 Ibid.
17309 U.S. 478 (1940).
18279 U.S. 159 (1929).
19 The distinction between the terms "unsettled" and "uncertain" or "difficult
to ascertain" as applied to state law is an important one. As used in this Note,
"unsettled" refers to situations in which an ambiguously worded state statute has not
previously been construed by the state courts or in which there has been no ex-
pression by those courts on a common-law issue. The expressions "uncertain" and
"difficult to ascertain" refer to situations where state statutes have been construed
or where there is a body of doctrine available, but where decision in the instant case
would require reasoning by analogy from, or interpretative extension of, this estab-
lished precedent. For a discussion of the problem of federal courts in diversity finding
state law see Note, 59 CoLum. L. REv. 504 (1959).
20 Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U.S. 478 (1940), involved deter-
mination of ownership rights to certain minerals under a railroad right of -way.
While the substantive rights of the parties did not involve a constitutional issue-
ownership was clearly a matter to be determined by state law-the question as to
what court could constitutionally adjudicate those rights was fundamentally in-
volved. The decision to "separate" the state issue and submit it to the state courts
can, therefore, be viewed as avoiding more reaching jurisdictional questions. Fur-
thermore, this case involved a peculiar type of federal equity jurisdiction, that of
a bankruptcy court, and inasmuch as bankruptcy law particularly premises an inter-
meshing of state and federal law, the case is of special moment.
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sion by the district court as to what authority the Texas statutes granted the
Texas Railroad Commission was in fact "a forecast rather than a determina-
tion," 21 especially since there were no authoritatively controlling Texas
decisions or even decisions*susceptible of application by analogy. In addi-
tion, issuance of an injunction would block the efforts of state regulatory
officials to cope with an important matter of local concern. Thus, both lines
of precedent merged: all the factors previously relied on-request for in-
junctive relief, "unsettled" state law, ongoing state administrative opera-
tions, federal constitutional question-were present in Pullman, and it is
easy to understand why the Court was unanimous.2 2 The cases that fol-
lowed, however, brought into sharper relief some of the problems inherent
in attempting to apply this policy to the varied fact situations presented to
the Court.
In general terms, those cases decided prior to the 1958 term again fall
into two categories depending upon which of the two pertinent interests,
comity or the avoidance of premature constitutional adjudication, predom-
inates. Some suggestion has been made that other factors such as the
invocation of diversity as opposed to federal question jurisdiction, and the
novelty or difficulty of the federal constitutional question, might or should
have influenced the course of the decisions,23 but opinions of the Court
provide little support for such propositions. Two Justices, Douglas and
Frankfurter, have in several dissents and concurrences concerned them-
selves with the particular jurisdictional grounds on which the case was
presented,24 but no majority appears to have drawn any jurisdictional dis-
tinction. While it is true that in diversity cases a special congressional
mandate for swift decision applies, 25 interpretation of state law is here more
frequently, more centrally determinative, 26 and the Court has not appeared
21 Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 499 (1941).
22 Justice Roberts took no part in decision of the case.
23 See HART & WEcHSLER, THE FEDERA. COURTS AND THE FEmERAL SYsTEu
88485 (1953).
24 Justice Douglas in Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 220 (1957),
appears to have based his dissent on the theory that abstention is not proper in a
case where the federal government is a party. Cf. his dissenting opinions in Har-
rison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 179 (1959) (jurisdiction premised on civil rights
statutes), discussed in text accompanying notes 68-83 infra; Government & Civic Em-
ployees v. Windsor, 353 U.S. 364 (1957) (issue of employees' right to join unions).
In Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943), Justice Frankfurter's vigorous
dissent was directed at the Court's alleged unwarranted undermining of the con-
gressional mandate of diversity jurisdiction.
25 County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 187 (1959) : "[A]
District Court cannot refuse to discharge the responsibility, imposed by Congress
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441, to render prompt justice in cases where its diversity
jurisdiction is invoked." (Emphasis added.) Cf. Justice Frankfurter's dissenting
opinion in Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943), and cases therein cited.
While the statute does not in express terms command "promptness" of decision, the
courts have interpreted 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (Supp. 1959), and 28 U.S.C. § 1441
(1952), as requiring this result. See Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943),
and cases therein cited. But see note 46 infra.
26A federal court sitting in diversity cases is considered for most decisional pur-
poses another court of the state whose law it is called on to apply. It is under
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in any brand of cases to be hesitant in requiring or allowing abstention if
either of the two "exceptional circumstances" was found to be present.
27
Nor has the Court appeared to have been motivated in its decisions by the
degree of difficulty of the constitutional question that was raised. That a
sharp line has been drawn, however, between cases involving constitutional
questions and those involving other federal questions is evident: 28 the
doctrine of avoiding premature determination of constitutional issues has
not been extended to issues of non-organic federal law.
Refusal to allow the federal courts to become enmeshed in matters
concerning the appraisal or the shaping of state domestic policy in relation
to functions granted to state administrative agencies or subdivisions would
appear to be the key to the decisions in Burford v. Sun Oil Co. 29 and
Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry.30 Both of these cases came
to the federal courts by way of diversity of citizenship, both involved federal
constitutional claims, yet the Court, citing Pullman in directing dismissals
of the actions, 31 emphasized the comity principle. It is significant that
Justice Frankfurter, author of the Pullman doctrine, rested his dissent in
the former and his concurrence in the latter case upon the ground that the
state law in each was "settled" 32 and that therefore, in the face of the
congressional prescription of prompt determination in diversity cases, the
majority was patently in error in not directing decision. And while it
appears that the principle of comity again influenced the Court's holding in
an affirmative duty to discover what the state law is and to apply it regardless of its
own predilections. See Note, 59 CoLum. L. Rsv. 504 (1959), and cases therein
cited.
27 See Railroad Comnm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941) ; notes 9-22 supra
and accompanying text.
28 See, e.g., Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472 (1949).
29 319 U.S. 315 (1943). This case involved a Texas Railroad Commission order
allocating production of oil and gas in a certain field. The commission was empowered
to secure the conservation of oil and natural gas resources of the state through the
medium of production quotas. The Court rested its refusal to permit federal deter-
mination of plaintiff's claim that the commission was acting in excess of its authority
on the ground that the exercise of federal jurisdiction would require interfering in a
regulatory scheme of important local concern.
30341 U.S. 341 (1951). The question presented was the validity of an order
by the Alabama Public Service Commission to a railroad company directing it to
continue service on two intrastate lines which were being operated at a deficit. As
the Court would otherwise be sanctioning interference with the regulation by a
state agency of intrastate railway service where no discrimination against interstate
traffic was alleged, the case was dismissed.
3 1 In both these cases the action was dismissed whereas in the Pulinan case and
cases involving constitutional questions, only a stay was ordered. Whether the
development of the device of staying proceedings had not matured until after decision in
these cases, so that the dismissals here and earlier in Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U.S.
176 (1935), can be dismissed as obsolescent law is open to speculation. In the recent
case of Martin v. Creasy, 360 U.S. 219 (1959), dismissal without retention of juris-
diction was again employed. For a recent view that outright dismissal is an improper
course of action see Wright, .rupra note 1. See also discussion note 106 infra.
32 The statutes in both cases had received considerable previous construction by the
state courts. Justice Frankfurter's disagreement with the majority in regarding the
unsettled condition of state law as determinative is consistent with his later positions
in Sutton v. Lieb, 342 U.S. 402 (1952), and Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472 (1949).
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Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, Inc.33 and perhaps in City of Meridan v.
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co.,34 Justice Frankfurter's own acquiescence
in these decisions can perhaps be explained by the fact that the state law
in both was clearly "unsettled" as well. 35 The majority of the Court, how-
ever, would appear to have committed itself to the proposition that regard-
less of whether or not a constitutional issue is "lurking," 36 and regardless
of the settled or unsettled condition of the applicable state law, abstention
is called for in situations where the decision of the federal courts would
involve a determination of state domestic policy or an unnecessary inter-
ference with the action of state officials.
By far the greater number of decisions, however, have involved the
other determining element present, if not predominant, in Pullman: the
possibility of avoiding federal constitutional adjudication where the status
of state law is unclear or unsettled and its clarification may make unneces-
sary the determination of the ultimate federal question. As noted above,
37
jurisdiction in Pullman was based on diversity of citizenship and a federal
constitutional issue of a substantial nature was raised. In deciding future
cases as they arose, it would have been possible for the Court to premise
the appropriateness of abstention upon the type of federal question pre-
sented, the basis of jurisdiction for federal action asserted, or the nature
and condition of the germane state law. Propper v. Clark 38 and City of
Chicago v,. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry.3 9 are clear holdings that abstention
is improper if the federal issue presented is of non-constitutional origin.
It is seemingly evident from the holdings in Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United
33 316 U.S. 168 (1942). This case involved the power of a city to regulate the
specifications for containers for the sale of milk. Issues involved were not only
interpretation of an unconstrued, ambiguously worded city ordinance, but also ques-
tions of the power of the city to impose its own controls in the face of a state statutory
scheme for milk control.
34 358 U.S. 639 (1959). Cf. Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po, 336 U.S. 368
(1949), 28 TExAs L. REv. 410 (1950), in which a previously unconstrued territorial
law of Hawaii concerning the teaching of languages in the schools was challenged.
35 In neither of these cases had the legislative enactments received any prior
judicial construction, nor had the city ordinance in Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies,
Inc., 316 U.S. 168 (1942), been tested for validity under the applicable state con-
stitution.
36 In neither case does the majority appear to consider the purported raising
of constitutional issues as of any importance.
3 7 See text following note 10 supra.
38337 U.S. 472 (1949). The issue turned on the power of the Federal Adminis-
trator of Alien Property under an executive order to seize the property of an alien.
Defendant receiver asserted that the alien's property had been completely vested in
himself by his appointment as receiver for debtors and was thus beyond the reach
of the Government. Despite the fact that a New York statute governing the rights
initially granted a state receiver was clearly susceptible of differing interpretations,
abstention was denied.
39 357 U.S. 77 (1958). Chicago had attempted to regulate intracity transport by
motor vehicle by requiring newly formed cab companies to apply for permit prior
to operation. As the cab company in question here was engaged solely in transport-
ing interstate passengers from one railvay terminal to another, and exclusive control
over interstate transportation had been vested by Congress in the Interstate Com-
merce Commission, the ordinance was invalidated. Abstention was held to be im-
proper as there was no "constitutional" issue raised.
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States,40 Albertson v. Millard,41 Sutton v. Leib 42 and Spector Motor Serv.,
Inc. v. McLaughlin,48 that the basis of jurisdiction-United States a party,
federal question or diversity-was not determinative. While it is true that
a considerable amount of emphasis was placed on the need for prompt dis-
patch in diversity cases by the Court in refusing abstention in Propper v.
Clark 44 and Meredith v. Winter Haven,45 such a rather facile, invariably
applicable and immediately appealing argument may readily be regarded as a
make-weight, and there were other factors in both these cases which may
account for the Court's denial of abstention.46 Within the range of cases
involving federal constitutional issues, it was the third possible sphere of dis-
tinction, that of the nature of the pertinent state law, that the Court appears
to have considered as controlling. In fact, the "unsettled" nature of state
law became a sina qua non for abstention. In Albertson v. Millard,47 the
Court reaffirmed its holding of Pullman that where a constitutional issue
is properly raised concerning an unconstrued and ambiguously worded state
statute, construction of the statute should be submitted to the state courts
before federal consideration. The dissent in Albertson rested its position
solely on the ground that the language of the statute was sufficiently clear
40352 U.S. 220 (1957). A Louisiana statute made title to mineral rights in
land deeded to the United States Government "imprescriptible." After a lessee of
the Government was sued in a state court, the Government brought action in the
federal district court to quiet title. The Supreme Court required abstention in order
that the effect of the previously unconstrued Louisiana statute might be determined
by the state courts prior to federal consideration of the issues.
41345 U.S. 242 (1953). The Court directed submission to the Michigan courts
of that state's newly enacted Communist Control Act prior to federal consideration of
the constitutional issues raised by plaintiff. Jurisdiction was premised upon the
presence of a federal question.
42 342 U.S. 402 (1952). After deciding the constitutional issue of the full faith and
credit to be accorded to a New York annulment of a Nevada marriage, the Court
directed that the decision regarding the remaining question of Illinois law be decided
by the lower federal courts. The "lurking" federal question having been laid to rest,
abstention became improper. Jurisdiction was premised solely on diversity, as in
Pullman; apparently the Court accorded this consideration no particular weight in
its decision.
43 323 U.S. 101 (1944). Jurisdiction in this case was predicated on the presenta-
tion of a federal question. Abstention was directed because attack on the state tax
statute involved questions as to what property the statute in fact taxed.
44 337 U.S. 472 (1949).
45 320 U.S. 228 (1943).
46 1n Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472 (1949), no pretense was made of a con-
stitutional issue nor was there any risk of upsetting any state regulatory scheme.
The federal government was suing to get possession of property belonging to an alien.
In Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1949), the power of a municipality under
state law to call its bonds at a date earlier than that originally fixed without pro-
viding premiums to the bondholders was in question. The allegedly unconstitutional
taking of property was not a substantial claim, nor was there any potential inter-
ference as such with state domestic policy. Furthermore, there was a considerable
body of Florida law on the subject, even though it must be conceded that ascertain-
ment was uncertain. Chief Justice Stone's insistence on the necessity for swift de-
cision in diversity cases and whatever implications unfavorable to abstention in the
exercise of diversity jurisdiction may be drawn therefrom (if indeed that insistence
be read as more than a make-weight), therefore would appear to go far beyond what
decision in the case required.
47 345 U.S. 242 (1953). See note 41 mepra.
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so that there was no reasonable doubt as to its applicability in the factual
situation presented.48 As in the earlier case of Toomer v. Witsell,49 it was
apparent that abstention would be improper if the statute was in fact rea-
sonably clear, since decision by the district court would not involve hazard-
ing a groundless guess as to state law issues. And this duty to decide
persisted in spite of the fact that the interference which would result by
issuance of an injunction against state officials was, in this situation, neces-
sary and unavoidable. But whether the policy of abstaining where there
were no apposite state precedents, or analogy-furnishing guide lines for
state statutory interpretation carried over, as well, into unclear areas of
common law was not decided. Sutton v. Leib 50 did involve an Illinois
common-law question of alimony, but here the Court directed immediate
decision by the federal forum on the ground that once the federal constitu-
tional issue raised-one that had to be and was decided irrespective of the
applicable state law rule-was already determined, no more reason for
abstention appeared. It is significant that justice Frankfurter would never-
theless have sanctioned abstention in this instance, apparently deeming that
even where there existed no novel federal constitutional question to be
avoided it was advisable to submit to the Illinois courts an issue of local
law as to which there were no Illinois decisions from which the district
court could reason. But Mr. Justice Frankfurter stood alone in Sutton.
And on the other hand, until his recent reinterpretation of Meredith v.
Winter Haven,51 it was generally thought that that case stood for the
proposition that abstention was not proper, especially in a diversity case,
where the district court had a considerable, although difficult, body of state
precedent with which to work.52
Thus, as late as the 1958 term the course of decision appeared to be
relatively clear and consistent, although a number of procedural ramifica-
tions 53 potentially involved in the abstention mechanism had not received
full consideration. With Pullman as the leading case, two discernible lines
of precedent had developed-the comity cases and those which refused
48345 U.S. 242 (1953). Other cases involving ambiguous statutes include Gov-
ernment & Civic Employees v. Windsor, 353 U.S. 364 (1957) (right of state employees
to join labor unions); Shipman v. DuPre, 339 U.S. 321 (1950) (regulation of fishing
and shrimping); and AFL v. Watson, 327 U.S. 582 (1946) ("right to work" law).
49334 U.S. 385 (1948).
50 342 U.S. 402 (1952). See note 42 supra.
51320 U.S. 228 (1943).
52 Mr. Justice Frankfurter in footnote in the majority opinion in Lousiana
Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 27 r2 (1959), stated that the
issue in Meredith "was whether jurisdiction must be surrendered to the state court."
(Emphasis added.) The lower court in Meredith had decided the controversy but
had been reversed on appeal by the circuit court, which ordered dismissal without
prejudice on abstention grounds. In Justice Frankfurter's view, the Court in rein-
stating the trial judge's determination was merely affirming the exercise of a dis-
cretion to abstain or decide deemed resident in the district court. This interpretation
of the Meredith holding is considerably more narrow than that which had been gen-
erally accepted. See the Court's discussion of Meredith in Propper v. Clark, 337
U.S. 472 (1949) (Justice Frankfurter dissented).
53 See notes 84-92 infra and accompanying text.
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prematurely to decide a constitutional issue. While in certain decisions
where both of these separable aspects were to some degree involved it might
be difficult if not impossible to ascertain the varying importance attached
to each by the individual justices, the rationale of the majority of the Court
in any particular case was usually apparent. Furthermore, all the cases
in which the abstention problem had been brought before the Court had
been equitable in nature. No major shifts in the basic tenets of the doctrine
as originally established appeared to be developing. Indeed, as recently as
January 1959, decision in City of Meridan v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel.
Co. 54 was announced in a per curiam opinion.
THE UNEXPECTED REEVALUATION
That the Supreme Court was to hand down in one day five cases in
which the doctrine of abstention would receive a complete reevaluation was
not generally anticipated. 55 In retrospect, however, there had been in-
dications that certain members of the Court were not satisfied with the
present state of the law. Mr. Justice Stewart in the majority opinion in
The Tungus v. Skovgaard " had raised, apparently on his own initiative,
the question of whether proper resolution of that case did not demand sub-
mission of the construction of the New Jersey Wrongful Death Act 57 to
the New Jersey Courts. He had, however, resolved to postpone definitive
deliberation of "the important and competing jurisdictional considerations
until such time as they could be thoroughly evaluated." 58 Of greater sig-
nificance perhaps was the citation by Justice Frankfurter in a concurring
opinion later filed in the same Tungus case of his earlier opinions in Sutton
v. Leib 59 and Propper v. Clark,60 a citation which confirmed his own con-
tinued dissatisfaction with certain of the established principles of the absten-
tion theory. Notwithstanding these intimations, the simultaneous release
of the decisions in Martin v. Creasy,61 Harrison v. NAACP,6 2 Lassiter v.
Northampton County Bd. of Elections,6 3 County of Allegheny v. Frank
Mashuda Co.6 4 and Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux 6 5
on June 8, 1959, came as something of a doctrinal shock, especially since
the gulf that apparently separates the members of the Court in these deci-
54 358 U.S. 639 (1959) (power of state to condemn ground for utility lines).
55 Cf. 28 U.S.L. WEEK 3049 (U.S. Aug. 25, 1959).
56358 U.S. 588 (1959). Counsel apparently did not raise the abstention issue;
Justice Stewart announced that it was interjected by the Court. Id. at 596.
57 N.J. REv. STAT. 2A: 31-1-31-6 (1951).
58 358 U.S. at 596.
59 342 U.S. 402 (1952). See note 42 supra.
60337 U.S. 472 (1949). See note 46 supra.
61360 U.S. 219 (1959).
62360 U.S. 167 (1959).
63 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
64 360 U.S. 185 (1959).
65 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
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sions had been by no means evident. Not only does this set of cases cast
in doubt certain of the principles which had heretofore served as the founda-
tion of the equitable abstention doctrine, but they indicate that the term
"equitable" as descriptive of the circumstances in which abstention is in-
voked may itself be a misnomer. Three of the cases follow the earlier pat-
tern of decision, 6 although each contains an aspect of special import in the
application of the doctrine. Reconciliation of the other two 67 with earlier
precedent is, however, extraordinarily difficult.
Development of the Established Pattern
Of all the cases, perhaps the decision in Harrison v. NAACP 68
received most nationwide attention. A set of five recently enacted Virginia
statutes designed to limit the legal-representation and lobbying activities of
the NAACP in Virginia were challenged.69 The Association, prior to any
test of applicability of the statutes in the Virginia courts, brought an action
to have the federal district court declare them unconstitutional and enjoin
their enforcement, asserting three bases of federal jurisdiction." The
three-judge constitutional court, basing its decision on a finding that the
legislation had been enacted "to nullify as far as possible the effect of the
decision . . . in Brown v. Board of Education . . . as parts of a gen-
eral plan of massive resistance," 71 held three of the statutes unconstitu-
tional on their face but abstained, staying proceedings pending construction
by state courts as to the other two.72 On direct appeal by Virginia from
the invalidation of her barratry and lobbying statutes, the Court in a six-
to-three decision reversed the lower court and directed that these three acts
should likewise have been subjected to "the possibility of limiting inter-
pretation" 73 by the Virginia courts. Mr. Justice Harlan in the majority
opinion rested his decision on the fact that the laws were "lengthy, detailed
and sweeping" and that several key words in each were ambiguous and
susceptible of restrictive construction. Although the finding of the district
court as to Virginia's legislative purpose might arguably be deemed to
negate any necessity for applying principles of comity, Justice Harlan
appears to have ignored this finding.74 In determining that abstention was
66 Harrison, Creasy and Lassiter.
67Mashhuda and Thibodaux.
68360 U.S. 167 (1959).
6 9 VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18-349.9-.37 (Supp. 1958) ; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54-74, -78, -79
(repl. 1958).
70 Diversity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (Supp. 1959) ; presence of a fed-
eral question, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1952); action under the civil rights statutes, 28
U.S.C. § 1343 (1952).
71 159 F. Supp. 503, 511, 515 (1958).
72 The district court ruled that relief should be granted where "the statute is free
from ambiguity and there remains no reasonable interpretation which vill render it
constitutional." Id. at 523.
73 360 U.S. at 177.
74 Justice Douglas in dissent raised the question as to whether the findings of
anti-integration legislative purpose would not make abstention particularly inappro-
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required he relied for precedent on the line of authority in which, federal
constitutional issues having been raised and the challenged state statutes
being found ambiguously worded and unconstrued, abstention was directed
or approved. 75 Unquestionably the most interesting aspect of the case,
and the major point made by the dissent, was that jurisdiction in Harrison
was premised primarily upon the civil rights statutes: 76 despite the strong
case that can be made for special urgency in having the federal courts
determine all the relevant issues in cases involving individuals' basic per-
sonal liberties, the majority passed over this point without comment.
Another interesting feature was that from the tenor of the majority opinion
abstention evidently was not conceived as a device to be "automatically" 77
applied by the lower courts. Indeed, that the district judge should rather
weigh whether or not the challenged statute is ambiguous and whether or
not there is a federal constitutional issue raised before he stays proceedings
was confirmed by the decision two weeks later in NAACP v. Bennett.78
The majority, in a short per curiam opinion reversing the summary stay
of proceedings granted by the lower court, pointed out that the lower court
priate in these circumstances. His position was essentially that the principle of
comity did not apply in those situations where state policy was flatly in conflict with
paramount federal law. The majority opinion does not explicitly direct itself to
answering this contention, Justice Harlan merely noting that, "In the view we take
of the case we do not reach the appellant's objections to these findings." 360 U.S. at
176. Thus perhaps the majority altogether refused to consider the findings as not
properly before the Court, reasoning that had the district court initially stayed its
proceedings, as the Court now determined it should have, it would never have had
occasion to reach a consideration of the merits. However, the tone of the opinion
suggests rather that the court did consider the findings, but deemed them irrelevant
on the abstention issue. It would not appear, as Justice Douglas assumes, that the
Virginia courts would necessarily find the same legislative history as that found by
the federal court, or that they would consider themselves in any way bound by such
a legislative history in construction of a statute under challenge of unconstitutionality.
Rather, the judicial principle that statutes are to be construed constitutionally would
probably override arguments concerning legislative purpose. But, still more funda-
mentally, the assertion that comity is not due to state policy antagonistic to federal
policy is itself open to question. The comity principle does not in its origin depend
upon a coincidence of the policy judgments of the forum jurisdiction and that of the
jurisdiction to which comity is extended, but rather upon a desire to respect that
latter policy within its scope of operation, whatever its nature. In the abstention
cases, especially, the operation of comity is precisely to allow the state jurisdictions
to decide for themselves what their policy is, without federal intervention. Whatever
the findings of Virginia purpose, then, comity would still require submission of the
statutes to the Virginia state courts.
75 The majority opinion cites the Pullman case as standing for the proposition
that abstention is proper only if either of the "exceptional circumstances" therein
found are present. Other cases cited were Government & Civic Employees v. Windsor,
353 U.S. 364 (1957); Albertson v. Millard, 345 U.S. 242 (1953); Spector Motor
Co. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101 (1944) ; Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, Inc., 316 U.S.
168 (1942).
76Mr. Justice Douglas with whom the Chief Justice and Justice Brennan joined
stated his belief that in abstaining the Court was failing to perform the "duty ex-
pressly enjoined by Congress on the federal judiciary in the Civil Rights Acts." He
saw no need to "give deference to a state policy that seeks to undermine paramount
federal law." 360 U.S. at 184.
77 NAACP v. Bennett, 360 U.S. 471 (1959). The district court had determined
that abstention was required as a matter of course. 4 RAcE REm. REP. 349 (1959).
78 Supra note 77.
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on remand should be "guided in its decision by the principles expressed
in Harrison v. NAACP." 79 Whether Bennett represents a definite shift
from the earlier more categorical approach to one in which the lower court
is given a considerable breadth of discretion in determining whether absten-
tion is proper is not wholly clear.80 It would seem, however, from the
language of the per curiam opinion taken in conjunction with Justice
Frankfurter's majority opinion in Thibodaux,"' that such a change has
been effected. Within the limits set by the Harrison 82 decision and the
decisions in Thibodaux and Mashuda,8 3 the district court would possess the
power, based on its own findings as to the clarity of state law, to decide
whether or not to abstain.
Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections,8 4 although not
before the Court on an abstention issue, is significant because it casts some
light on the subsequent course of a case in which the abstention mechanism
has been utilized. The federal district court, upon complaint by a Negro
resident of North Carolina that she had been deprived of her voting rights
in contravention of the fourteenth, fifteenth and seventeenth amendments,
stayed its proceedings pending determination by the North Carolina courts
of the status of that state's constitutional and statutory literacy test.85 The
North Carolina Supreme Court, interpreting its constitutional provisions
in the light of subsequent organic amendments and finding the prescribed
literacy requirement separable from an objectionable grandfather clause,
ultimately overruled the plaintiff's contention that the voter-selection scheme
violated the federal constitution.8 6 The Court, on appeal from the state
79 360 U.S. at 471.
80While a ruling that the district courts are not "automatically" to stay pro-
ceedings whenever faced with an unconstrued state statute, but are to make the kind
of complex consideration of situational factors typified by the Court's opinion in
Harrison, may be interpreted as a recognition of some measure of discretion in the
lower court, such an interpretation is by no means inevitable. That the Supreme
Court should require a decision to be made on balance of a number of interlocking
and countervailing elements is not necessarily to say that that balancing will not be
subject to strict reappraisal on review, or that the Court will not itself independently
strike the balance in every case before it without regard to the conclusion of the
court below. Merely to enumerate relevant considerations is not to declare the degree
of freedom with which the trial judge is to appraise those considerations, nor does
the intricacy of the considerations itself inevitably imply a legal discretion. However,
while Bennett alone might not unreasonably be read as reserving to the Court the role
of plenary redetermination of the original abstention ruling of the district court in
every case, Bennett, seen in view of Thibodaux, seems more plausibly to constitute
additional support for the thesis that the Court is shifting to a doctrine stressing lower
court discretion.
81360 U.S. 25 (1959). See notes 120-131 infra and accompanying text.
82 360 U.S. 167 (1959). See notes 68-76 supra and accompanying text.
83 360 U.S. 185 (1959). See notes 109-119 infra and accompanying text.
84 360 U.S. 45 (1959). United States Law Week classified this case under the
heading "Elections." 27 U.S.L. WEEK 4353 (U.S. June 9, 1959).
85 The North Carolina Constitution included in one section a provision for the
literacy test and a grandfather clause. The grandfather clause being clearly uncon-
stitutional, the validity of the test depended upon whether subsequent amendment to
a different section of the constitution and the passage of a new statute in 1957 had
effectively severed the literacy test from the invalid article.
86248 N.C. 102, 102 S.E.2d 853 (1958).
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supreme court, affirmed, but was careful to note that the district court was
still open to the plaintiff if she chose to attack the manner in which the
otherwise valid scheme was being administered.8 7 An effective route for
the handling of the difficult problem of abstention in putative civil rights
denials is thus opened. Attack on the face validity of unconstrued state
statutes amenable to limiting construction because of lack of clarity would
require initial abstention on the part of the federal district courts. Sub-
mission to the state court systems, subject to United States Supreme Court
review, of the paper, legal-question issues of federal constitutionality would
not involve a risk of biased fact finding and record distortion while, on
the other hand, it minimizes "unnecessary" federal interference in state
concerns.88 As the most recent cases indicate, there may be a difference of
opinion among members of the Court as to the degree of interference which
meets the "unnecessary" 89 standard, but it would seem that if in fact
the plaintiff is sufficiently protected both from unwarranted delay and
expense and from the risk of unfair treatment under state procedures, action
on the part of the lower federal court would not be required. Immediate
review of an adverse state court holding on the federal claim is available
through either appeal or certiorari: ° by pursuing this direct route to the
Supreme Court from the state court system, decision on the legal issue
can be achieved sooner than if the plaintiff were forced to return to the
district court for its findings before appeal. There is the added advantage
of encouraging the state court to construe its statute in a perceived consti-
tutional context. The danger of federal invalidation of a statute which,
submitted to the state courts, might be saved through limiting construction,
is avoided.91 Thus, consistent with the most effective expedition of plain-
tiff's case, a maximum of protection and a greater surety of decision by an
appropriate tribunal is secured. Only if, in a further challenge to a statute
of itself held valid, plaintiff subsequently attacks the unjust or discrimina-
tory manner in which the statute is applied or enforced, will the federal
87 Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 50 (1959).
88 "Unnecessary" interference would appear to include at a minimum any invalida-
tion of a state statute where there is plausible means of saving it. While the concept
clearly extends to potential blocking by federal court action of state regulatory schemes
affecting only intrastate affairs, there is considerable doubt as to how far it carries
when applied to relations between federal and state courts. If there are no counter-
vailing factors which would require federal court action-e.g., a congressional grant
of specific jurisdiction-wise judicial administration might justify a self-imposed
restraint where state judicial processes are already underway.
89 See the majority opinion in Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux,
360 U.S. 25 (1959), discussed in text accompanying notes 120-131 infra.
90 Appeal if the state court upheld the state statute and denied the federal claim,
as in the instant case, 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) (1952) ; certiorari if the state upheld the
federal claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3) (1952).
91 Cf. Government & Civic Employees v. Windsor, 353 U.S. 364 (1957). The
Court directed abstention a second time on the ground that the state court had not
interpreted the statute in light of the specific federal constitutional objections raised
in the district court. See also Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections,
360 U.S. 45 (1959).
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court be required to decide the case. 2 Lassiter, then, may demonstrate the
way to obviate a considerable number of factors which would otherwise
have strongly weighed against the use of the abstention doctrine in the
highly critical civil rights field. And unintentionally perhaps, Justice
Douglas may have further pointed the way toward the answer to his
dissenting position in the Harrison case.9 3 Depending on the nature of the
plaintiff's case, the decision whether or not to abstain may be grounded not
solely on principles of comity or concern over premature constitutional
adjudication, but upon considerations of convenience of the allegedly in-
jured party as well.94
While the rationale of the decision in Harrison is clearly discernible,
that of Martin v. Creasy 95 is not. There plaintiff landholders had chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania Limited Access Highways
Act 9 6 on the ground that deprivation of ingress and egress without com-
pensation was an unconstitutional "taking" of property in violation of the
fourteenth amendment. The district court initially stayed proceedings while
a declaratory judgment action was initiated in the Pennsylvania courts to
determine the effect of the statute.9 7  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
affirming a refusal to construe the act in advance of the post hoc judicial
proceedings which the act itself authorizes, explicitly adopted in its per
curiam decision the lower court's opinion that "at all times [plaintiffs']
constitutional rights, whatever they may be, will be guarded and pro-
tected." 98 The lower federal court, after this inconclusive state judgment,
determined for itself that in fact the statute took a property right without
compensation, and issued a sweeping injunction barring the implementation
of the state's limited access highway program.99 On appeal, the Supreme
Court reversed, all the Justices joining in the holding that such an injunction
was improper. 90 Justice Douglas did maintain, however, that the situation
called for a federal declaratory judgment concerning the plaintiff's federal
rights. Whether the Court's holding can be attributed to the honored equity
92 The state statute would have been by this time authoritatively construed and
the district court would be faced with only the task of determining the facts and
applying the settled state law to them. It is arguable that this is the level at which
there exists most danger of distortion or biased fact finding and that such danger is
one of the primary justifications underlying the grant of jurisdiction to the federal
courts.
93 See note 76 supra and accompanying text.
94Within the limits of discretion prescribed by Congress it would appear that
wise administration of the judicial system is a factor to be taken into consideration.
95360 U.S. 219 (1959).
96 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, §§ 2391.1-.15 (Supp. 1958).
97 The act clearly provided for deprivation of the right to leave and enter the
designated road; compensation was to be limited to "damages arising from an actual
taking of property . . . . not . . . for consequential damages where no property
is taken." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 2391.8 (Supp. 1958).
98 Creasy v. Lawler, 8 Pa. D. & C.2d 535 (C.P. 1956), opinion adopted, 389 Pa.
635, 133 A.2d 178 (1957). (Emphasis added.)
99 Creasy v. Stevens, 160 F. Supp. 414 (W.D. Pa. 1958).
100 Martin v. Creasy, 360 U.S. 219 (1959). In his dissenting opinion justice
Douglas conceded that the injunction which was issued was improper.
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notion of no "irreparable injury," 101 whether it was controlled-as the
majority intimates and the concurring Justices clearly assert 10 2-by the
principles of comity as expressed in Burford,10 3 or whether the lurking
evitable federal constitutional question influenced the decision, the case
fits well into the previously determined pattern of decision. The interesting
feature of it for a consideration of the abstention doctrine is its exemplifica-
tion of one of the problems that can arise when the federal courts refuse to
act: the state courts themselves may fail to provide a satisfactory answer
to the question whose posture caused the district court to abstain.
Shifts in the Scope of the Doctrine
The decisions in County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co.10 4 and
Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux,10 5 unlike those con-
sidered above, represent a definite break from past precedent. While both
these cases involved eminent domain proceedings and jurisdiction in both
was premised on diversity, in Mashuda district court abstention was re-
versed and in Thibodaux it was approved. 0 6 Although the holding in
101 Invocation of a federal court's injunctive powers is dependent on a showing
of "irreparable injury." See Hershey Mfg. Co. v. Adamowski, 360 U.S. 717 (1959)
(citing Doud v. Hodge, 350 U.S. 485 (1956)). On appeal from a judgment of the
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissing a petition by a slot-
machine manufacturer seeking injunction of enforcement of an Illinois regulatory
statute, the Court affirmed per curiam on the lower court's explicit finding that there
was no "irreparable injury" shown.
102360 U.S. at 224 (opinion of the Court), 225-26 (concurring opinion).
103 319 U.S. 315 (1943). See note 29 supra.
104 360 U.S. 185 (1959).
105 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
106 In Mashuda the district court dismissed the action and, on appeal, was reversed
by the circuit court. Thus the Supreme Court in affirming was not technically directing
immediate decision by the district court; it was merely approving a ruling that dis-
missal was erroneous. In contrast, the district court in Thibodaux had stayed pro-
ceedings but retained jurisdiction, and its order of stay had been reversed on appeal.
Here the Court, reversing, approved the initial stay with jurisdiction retained. It is
possible, then, to distinguish the two cases on rather narrow procedural grounds.
See Wright, The Abstention Doctrine Reconsidered, 37 TEXAs L. REv. 815, 821
(1959). The same analysis could be employed to square Thibodaux with Meredith v.
Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943), see note 52 supra, a case deemed by the Thibo-
daux dissenters "squarely contrary" to Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 37 (dissenting opinion),
but which also involved a dismissal, not a stay. Nor would such a procedural dis-
tinction be without support in reason. Assuming the desirability of prior submission
to the state courts of state law issues, the stay and the dismissal procedures, as
vehicles for such submission, may offer different practical effects. By dismissal the
federal courts lose all control over the subsequent disposition of the action (presuming
that the state courts have subsequently assumed jurisdiction over it), including the
very important power of expediting its prompt determination if the state tribunals
seem inclined to prejudice plaintiff by delay. Injunction cannot issue to stay state
process once federal jurisdiction has been surrendered. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1952).
The significance of retaining jurisdiction to protect a party remitted to a possibly
hostile or discriminatory state court from that court's sitting on his rights becomes
apparent, especially, in a civil rights context like that of Harrison or, indeed, in a
case like Mashuda where a state agency, having taken land for an allegedly private
purpose, can continue to put it to that purpose pendente lite. But this problem of
guarding litigants properly before the federal courts from the potential harms of state
dilatory action in abstention situations can, on the other hand, be too much stressed.
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Mashuda is in line with past decisions,' 0 7 the rationale of the opinion
seemingly represents a departure. Apparently the Court, faced squarely
with the conflict of "competing jurisdictional considerations," 108 was unable
to achieve a common ground for their resolution.
In the Mashuda case, the Court affirmed reversal by the circuit court
of a district court's dismissal premised on abstention principles. 109 Wis-
consin residents owning land adjacent to an airport in Pennsylvania, after
initially submitting to a board of viewers '1 o determination of the damages
sustained through county condemnation of the property for future expan-
sion of the airport facilities, brought an action for ejectment in the federal
court on the ground that the taking had been for private and not public
First, that problem appears not to arise at all in such cases as Thibodaux where, the
state agency being itself the prosecuting party who seeks by judicial action to alter
the status quo, substantial state delay is neither likely nor injurious to the interest
seeking federal protection. Second, notwithstanding the danger of delay, there is
a long line of established precedent including Burford, see note 29 supra, and Alabama
Pub. Serv. Comm'n, see note 30 supra, firmly holding dismissal proper. "In these
cases, in which the federal court should defer to avoid interference with state activities,
dismissal of the action, rather than retention of jurisdiction pending a state deter-
mination, is normally appropriate" Wright, supra at 820.
The Burford line, however, is clearly distinguishable from a Thibodaux-Mashuda
situation in another dimension. In the former, earlier cases where suit was for
injunction, the decision to abstain and to refer to the state courts the determination
as to the validity of local administrative action left nothing remaining between the
parties which a federal court might subsequently adjudicate. Retention of juris-
diction, then, was unnecessary. In Thibodaux, on the other hand-an expropriation
proceeding removed by the property owner to the federal forum-if the Louisiana
state courts uphold the validity of the taking, there still remains the issue of damages
on which the owner, in diversity, is entitled to be heard before the district court. The
trouble with this reasoning, which by distinguishing injunctive or declaratory suits
from eminent domain or other damage proceedings attempts to reinstate in spite of
Burford the stay-versus-dismissal distinction, is that, however theoretically sound, it
simply does not fit the facts of Mashuda. For in Mashuda, unlike Thibodaux, the
owner of the property expropriated had not sought federal jurisdiction on the com-
pensation issue, but was already engaged in state court litigation for the determination
of damages.
It would appear, then, that to seize upon this evident procedural distinction as
a means of reconciling the Mashuda-Thibodaux divergences would be unwarranted.
In fact, in his separate concurring opinion in Thibodaux, Justice Stewart-whose
views are perhaps particularly significant here inasmuch as his was one of the two
votes that swung the Court from Thibodaux to Mashuda-remarks the procedural
difference between the two cases. But then he goes on to indicate that other dis-
tinctions are more pertinent: "This case [Thibodaux] is totally unlike . . .Mashuda
except for the coincidence that both cases involve eminent domain proceedings.
In Mashuda the Court holds that it was error for the District Court to disliss the
complaint. The Court further holds in that case that, since the controlling state law
is clear and only factual issues need be resolved, there is no occasion in the interest
of justice to refrain from prompt adjudication." 360 U.S. at 31. (Emphasis added.)
And in view of the temper of Justice Brennan's majority opinion in Mashuda, vigor-
ously denying the applicability of the abstention doctrine and insisting on the protesting
property owner's right to swift federal trial, it would hardly seem open to the district
court on remand to stay proceedings as was done in Thibodaux.
107 Abstention was denied in a legal action where neither a constitutional issue
nor a potential interference with state functions was present.
108 The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588, 596 (1959).
109 256 F.2d 241 (3d Cir. 1958), reversing 154 F. Supp. 628 (W.D. Pa. 1957).
110The Pennsylvania statute authorizing condemnation established an elaborate
system of expert appraisers for calculation of the damage occasioned by the taking.
PA. STAT. ANx. tit. 26, §§ 1-82 (1952).
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use in violation of the applicable Pennsylvania statute."' While it is true
that initially the ejectment claim was coupled with a request for an injunc-
tion against further proceedings then pending in the state damage action,I"
it is clear that this request had since been dropped and that the action before
the Supreme Court was essentially legal in nature." 3 It is significant there-
fore that the majority of the Court in refusing to sanction abstention chose
not to rest their decision on the theory that the abstention doctrine was to be
conceived as an exercise of the discretion of the equity court and had previ-
ously been applied only in equitable proceedings. Instead, Justice Brennan
took great pains to establish that not only was there no constitutional
issue raised and no threatened interference with state domestic policy, but
also that Pennsylvania law was in fact "settled" and in no way uncertain." 4
This emphasis on the "settled" nature of the governing state law is especially
surprising since until this case, although relevant in conjunction with one
or the other of the "exceptional circumstances," the "settled" state law
factor had not of itself been considered determinative. Whether in fact it
was determinative of Mashuda is difficult to discern, inasmuch as Justice
Brennan himself vigorously dissented in Thibodaux 115 where the "un-
settled" nature of state law appears to have been controlling. Furthermore,
the dissent in Mashuda is not helpful in clarifying the question. Justice
Clark rested his opinion on a combination of a waiver theory and the
technical point that damage proceedings and a question of the validity of
a taking of property might, under Pennsylvania law, be joined in the single
pending state court suit." 6 Although the circuit court had heard reargu-
ment on the possible consolidation point and had definitely rejected it,
117
at least three members of the Court joined with Justice Clark in dissenting
II PA. STAT. ANN. fit. 16, §§ 2202, 5402(c) (1952). The county, after taking
possession of the property, had immediately entered into an agreement leasing a
portion of the land condemned to a contractor for his storage of supplies and equip-
ment. While the contractor was at the time engaged in work on the expansion of
the airport facilities, and the lease provided that cancellation was automatic in the
event that his contracts were terminated, the plaintiff's theory was that the original
condemnation had been motivated by a desire to provide the contractor with storage
space and was thus "taking" for a "private purpose" rather than a "public use."
112 Both parties had appealed to the common pleas court from the award of the
board of viewers.
113 Justice Brennan in the majority opinion noted that this request had been
expressly abandoned in oral argument before the Court. 360 U.S. at 188 n.1.
114 "The applicable Pennsylvania substantive law is clear: 'It is settled law in
Pennsylvania that private property cannot be taken for a private use under the power
of eminent domain.' . . . On the basis of this settled law respondents brought suit
... " 360 U.S. at 187-88. "[T]he state law that the District Court was asked
to apply was clear and certain." 360 U.S. at 196.
115 360 U.S. at 31-44.
116 The position of the dissent appears to be that the issue of the validity of the
taking should have been raised at the time the case was submitted to the board of
viewers; furthermore, since the case had by this time been appealed to the Pennsyl-
vania common pleas court, the present action could and should be consolidated with
the already pending suit. 360 U.S. at 201-02.
117 256 F.2d at 243.
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on this ground.118 Thus, while the decision in the case is completely
consistent with past precedent, the language and apparent rationale of the
majority opinion, emphasizing the condition of the relevant state law, hint
at a departure from the precedents. This deparature finds its still more
startling confirmation in Thibodaux.119
In contrast to Mashuda, the Court in Thibodaux 120 affirmed the exer-
cise by a district court of its discretion in staying, on its own motion, pro-
ceedings in eminent domain which had been initiated by the city under local
procedures and removed to the federal forum by the nonresident corporate
defendant on grounds of diversity.1 2  A Louisiana statute, never previously
tested, purporting to authorize municipalities to condemn property belong-
ing to public utilities, had been ordered first to be submitted to the Louisiana
state courts for determination as to its effect.' 22  On appeal from grant of
the stay, the circuit court had reversed, 23 holding that abstention was not
appropriate in an eminent domain case because that proceeding was not
equitable in nature and that, even were abstention available, there were
present in this instance no such "exceptional circumstances" as would war-
rant its application. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for a majority of
the Court, 24 reversed again and overruled the circuit court on both grounds.
Summarily disposing of the contention that abstention was not available in
legal actions 125 by typifying eminent domain proceedings as "unique,"
involving the "sovereign prerogative of the state," and hence analogous
to suits in equity 2 6-- and although there was no pretense made of present
lurking constitutional issues 127-he went on to find that since the state law
was "unsettled," postponement of decision was "best for fruition." 128 The
dissent by Justice Brennan, author of the majority opinion in Mashuda,
vigorously disputed both of these conclusions. The only possible rationales
that Justice Brennan could attribute to the Thibodaux majority, in light of
118 See note 116 supra. Justices Black, Frankfurter and Harlan joined in Mr.
Justice Clark's dissent. These four Justices, with Justices Stewart and Whittaker,
composed the Thibodaux majority.
1"9 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
120 Ibid.
121 The Supreme Court in its grant of certiorari limited review by excluding any
questions concerning the appealability of this order. 358 U.S. 893 (1958).
122 This 1900 statute, LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 19:101 (1950), apparently granted
power to municipalities to condemn public utility property, but the power had been
called in question by an opinion filed by the Attorney General of Louisiana. 360 U.S.
at 30.
123 255 F.2d 774 (5th Cir. 1958).
124The Chief Justice and Justices Brennan and Douglas dissented. Justice
Stewart wrote a brief concurring opinion.
125 "These prior cases have been cases in equity, but they did not apply a tech-
nical rule of equity procedure. They reflect a deeper policy derived from our fed-
eralism." 360 U.S. at 28.
126 360 U.S. at 28-29.
127 Justice Frankfurter made no attempt to refute this, the strong point of the
dissent.
128 360 U.S. at 29.
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Mashuda, were either a developing "distaste for diversity jurisdiction" 129
or a cognizance of the differing degrees of "clarity" of state law in the two
cases. 130 Again, unfortunately, it is difficult to ascertain what influenced
the members of the Court who had voted with the majority in Mashuda,
apparently by their silence subscribing to Justice Brennan's view that
eminent domain proceedings did not per se involve the "hazard of friction
in federal-state relations," 131 to arrive at an opposite outcome in Thibodaux.
While it may also be possible to distinguish the two cases on a narrow
procedural ground, 3 2 the far more significant difference between them
consists in the differing conditions of the state law in each, and it appears
likely that this "settled" law factor was in fact controlling.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
It is clear that these five cases have considerable import for the future
of abstention as a friction-cushioning device within the federal system.
Speaking to the situation of a federal constitutional issue which hinges on
the construction of a state statute, the Court in NAACP v. Bennett '
33
affirmed what was implicit in Harrison v. NAACP, 34 that abstention was
not to be "automatically" employed by the lower federal courts whenever
an unconstrued or ambiguously worded statute was called into question.
The modus decidendi of the Harrison majority in reasoning that such par-
ticular statutory words as "advocacy," "lobbying," and "stirring-up" 13r
were in fact susceptible of differing and limiting construction, implies as a
logical corollary that when legislative language is clear and only one rea-
sonable interpretation of the words is possible, the district court would be
free immediately to decide the constitutional issue. There is Supreme Court
authority in support of this proposition; 136 moreover, this is precisely what
' 29 Id. at 32.
130 In Mashuda there was a considerable body of judicial doctrine delineating
"private" as against "public" use. As Justice Stewart in his concurring opinion in
Thibodaux phrased it, "the controlling law [in Mashuda] is clear and only factual
issues need be resolved .... ." 360 U.S. at 31. In Thibodaux, however, the "con-
trolling law" as to whether the city possessed the power to condemn had not previously
been determined by any court.
131 In Mashuda Justice Brennan wrote: "It is suggested, however, that abstention
is justified on the ground of avoiding the hazard of friction in federal-state relations
any time a District Court is called on to adjudicate a case involving the State's power
of eminent domain . . . But the fact that a case concerns a State's power of
eminent domain no more justifies abstention than the fact that it involves any other
issue related to sovereignty." 369 U.S. at 191-92. (Emphasis added.) In dissent
in Thibodaux he wrote: "But the fact of the matter is that this case does not involve
the slightest hazard of friction with a State, the indispensable ingredient for upholding
abstention on grounds of comity . . ." 360 U.S. at 34.
132 See note 106 supra.
133 360 U.S. 471 (1959).
134 360 U.S. 167 (1959).
135 Id. at 177.
136 Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948). Cf. City of Chicago v. Atchison,
T. & S.F. Ry., 357 U.S. 77 (1958) (federal pre-emption, not federal constitutional
issue).
ABSTENTION
a lower court has recently done in invalidating a Pennsylvania statute re-
quiring Bible reading in the public schools.137  While one may seriously
question whether in fact the language of this statute was not susceptible of a
saving restrictive construction, 138 the further and more fundamental ques-
tion remains: whether, in the interests of judicial comity, the Pennsylvania
courts should not have been granted an opportunity in any event to pass
on the validity of the statute prior to federal consideration. If in fact the
statute was amenable to some alternative reading, or if it was possible for
the courts of Pennsylvania by striking a portion of it to save its constitu-
tionality, the present federal interference with an expression of state legis-
lative policy might have been avoided. The statute had not been tested, and
it is quite possible that the Pennsylvania courts might themselves have
invalidated it on either state constitutional grounds alone or on a combina-
tion of state and federal grounds, thus either completely mooting the federal
constitutional question 13 9 or presenting a narrowed issue for Supreme
Court certiorari determination in respect of the federal basis of the hold-
ing.140 There appears to be no serious risk of biased fact-finding or
potential prejudicial and irreparable slanting of the record which would or
should preclude this course of action. 41  Furthermore, seeming clarity may
in fact be deceptive. On the basis of the Harrison case and the earlier
decision in Albertson v. Millard,142 there appears to be considerable diffi-
culty in ascertaining which laws are so "clearly" worded that immediate
federal decision is required.143 By more stringently regarding the appar-
ently indispensable finding of clarity-by in effect recognizing that every
legislative provision subjected to constitutional attack is in a measure un-
clear-the risk of inordinate delay caused by possible reversal of the district
court on the ground that its findings as to degree of unclarity were incorrect
would have been averted, and decision expedited. Not only would
precipitous federal action have been avoided, but the friction-reducing in-
terests of judicial comity would have been served. When or if a challenge
'13 Schempp v. School District, 141 THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (Philadelphia)
273 (E.D. Pa., Sept. 16, 1959). The statutory mandate requiring reading of 10
verses of the Bible every morning prior to the start of school was challenged by the
parents of a child who belonged to the Unitarian faith.
138 Apparently the New York courts have ruled a similar law constitutional.
See Lewis v. Board of Education, 157 Misc. 520, 285 N.Y. Supp. 164 (Sup. Ct. 1935),
inodified, 247 App. Div. 106, 286 N.Y. Supp. 174 (1936), appeal dismissed, 276 N.Y.
490, 12 N.E.2d 172 (1937). See also Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 742 (1956).
139 No federal review would be available as the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is
of course the final arbiter of Pennsylvania law.
140 See note 90 mipra.
141 The only question submitted to the Pennsylvania courts would have been the
legal one of statutory construction.
142 345 U.S. 242 (1953)
143 Ibid. See note 41 supra. If in fact words such as "satellite" and "lobbying" are
susceptible of "limiting construction"' when there can be little question concerning the
specific objective of the statute in which they are used--control of the Communist
party in Albertson, restriction of NAACP activity in Harrison--then there would
not appear to be many situations in which "clarity" is "clear."
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to the manner in which the statute was applied were made, the federal
courts, in accordance with the suggestion in Lassiter,1 44 would have had an
authoritative state construction of the statute with which to work.
But while consideration of the significant points in Harrison, Martin,
and Lassiter may be of interest, the decisions in Thibodaux145 and
Mashuda 4 6 have by far the greatest import for the future of abstention.
All of the previous cases in which abstention had been considered or applied
had involved an attempt to invoke the equity powers of the federal courts.
147
The Court in Pullman, the acknowledged leading case, had squarely rested
its decision to stay the proceedings on the traditional discretionary powers
possessed by equity.1 48  Thibodaux, therefore, is the first holding that
abstention is not a "technical" concept peculiar to equity jurisdiction, but is
available in an action at law. Nor is the reasoning of the majority opinion
in Mashuda, specifically resting its disapproval of abstention on grounds
other than the legal-equitable distinction, 49 inconsistent with this extension
worked by Thibodaux.150 Even conceding that the circumstances of these
cases are clearly analogous to earlier precedent, and that the transposition
of "equitable" principles to this "unique" kind of action at law may be justi-
fied on the ground that potential obstruction of the "sovereign prerogative"
of the state to condemn private property for public use threatens the same
state-federal frictions as are inherent in interference by equitable injunction,
this narrowest possible view of the cases still entails an expansion of the
doctrine.' 5' But thus to read Thibodaux-to view eminent domain proceed-
ings peculiarly as per se so entangling the federal courts in matters of
critical state concern that the hands-off policy approved in Burford 52 and
Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n M must be there applied-ignores the fact
that at least two of the justices who voted with the majority in Thibodaux,
by their silence at least may be taken to have approved Justice Brennan's
rejection of this contention in Mashuda.54 It is significant as well that
Justice Frankfurter, author of the majority opinion in Thibodaux, vigor-
ously dissented in both Burford and Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n on the
ground that since a body of law existed by which the federal court could
144 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
145 See notes 120-32 .spra and accompanying text.
146 See notes 109-19 supra and accompanying text.
147 Justice Frankfurter in the majority opinion in Thibodaux conceded this point.
See note 125 supra.
148 See note 2 supra.
149 The majority could not find a lurking constitutional issue, possible interference
with the state, or "unsettled" state law. See note 114 mipra.
150 See note 119 supra and accompanying text.
151 By identifying abstention as a technical concept of equity jurisdiction, its
applicability could have been practically limited to only the most obvious instance of
interference with state action, injunctive relief.
152319 U.S. 315 (1943). See note 29 supra.
153 341 U.S. 341 (1951). See note 30 supra.




decide the state law issues, possible friction with state domestic policy
was not of itself sufficient grounds to warrant abstention.155
The broadest permissible reading of Thibodaux, on the other hand,
would be that the Court has now raised the question of the unsettled nature
of state law from a subsidiary sina qua non demanded only where other
factors make abstention appropriate, to the level of an independent and
autonomous determining consideration. 156 In short, abstention would be
justified if the only complication were that state law was unsettled. How-
ever, while possible support for this position may be found in earlier opin-
ions of Justice Frankfurter 157 and in Justice Stewart's Tungus dicta 158
and short concurring opinion in Thibodaux,5 9 it is difficult to believe that
the other members of the Court who voted in the Thibodaux majority have
so radically altered their earlier positions. 1 0 Moreover, an interpretation of
Thibodaux which would authorize a district court to stay proceedings in all
diversity cases merely because state law is unclear not only opens the road
to abstention in all routine contract and negligence cases, but also ignores
at least one critical element which, in the facts of Thibodaux, is available
to limit its holding.161 There the city, acting as an instrumentality of the
state, was in the position of a defendant in the federal court: an obvious
analogue to the earlier situations where the comity principle was found to
dictate non-obstruction of state governmental function. Thus while it may
be argued that Thibodaux is a key link in the chain by which the Court
will ultimately arrive at abnegation of all federal decision of doubtful state
law questions, this contention, at the present time, would not appear to be
warranted.162 An intermediate view, although one for the most part un-
expressed in the opinions of the Court, would more satisfactorily reconcile
15 5 In Sutton v. Leib, 342 U.S. 402 (1952), note 42 supra, one can see an extreme
example of how far Justice Frankfurter would carry his particular conception of
interference with state policy. There, even after the constitutional issue had been
decided by the Court, his position was that the remaining state law issue-a question
of alimony-should have been submitted to the state courts rather than remanded
for determination by the lower federal forum. With no guide lines to enlighten the
district court in this new and "uncharted" area of state law, Justice Frankfurter
seemed to regard a possibly leading federal decision itself as such an interference as
would warrant abstention. No other member of the Court, however, joined him in
this view. It is significant that in Sutton the litigation was between private parties;
this factor alone adequately distinguishes Thibodaux.
156 See the language of Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Sutton v.
Leib, 342 U.S. 402 (1952).
157 See his dissenting opinions in Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472 (1949) ; Burford
v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943); and his concurring opinions in Sutton v. Leib,
342 U.S. 402 (1952); Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341
(1951).
158 358 U.S. 588, 596 (1959).
159 "The Court further holds in that case [Mashuda] that, since the controlling
state law is clear and only factual issues need be resolved, there is no occasion in the
interest of justice to refrain from prompt adjudication." 360 U.S. at 31.
160 Only justice Frankfurter dissented on the abstention issue in Sutton v. Leib,
342 U.S. 402 (1952). He wag again alone in Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472 (1949),
Justice Jackson resting his dissent on other grounds.
161360 U.S. 25 (1959).
162 Clearly the Chief Justice and Justices Brennan and Douglas, at least, would
not subscribe. See their dissenting opinions in Thibodaux and in Harrison. It may
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the apparent conflict between Mashuda and Thibodaux on either of two
grounds: a wide legal discretion in the trial court whose exercise was to
be regarded with respect on review, or a narrower and more refined con-
ception of what constitutes "unsettled" state law.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the majority opinion in Thibodaux dis-
tinguishes the earlier holding in Meredith v. Winter Haven16 3 on the
ground that in the latter the Court affirmed an exercise of "discretion" in
the district court to decide a case in which, implicitly, it felt itself capable
of making a decision on the state law questions.6t In Thibodaux, where
the district court itself had initially determined to abstain-had abstained
in fact sua sponte-because of the confusion it felt engendered by the ap-
parent conflict between a state attorney general's opinion and the wording
of an otherwise unconstrued statute, this decision of the lower court was
held to be within its "wise discretion." 165 Taken together with the apparent
stress in Bennett 166 on a considered and deliberative process by which the
district court is to determine the propriety of abstention, this discrimination
would appear to point to the development of a clearly defined area of lower
court discretion: a realm of determination within which that court's ap-
praisal of its own competence to discover clear guide lines of governing
policy already articulated in the applicable state law, balanced in conjunction
with such more traditional considerations as non-obstruction of state ad-
ministrative programs, will be treated as conclusive. Thus, abstention in
Thibodaux, where a major decision of local policy direction, left unresolved
by the ambiguous language of a statute, had not yet been further delineated
by state judicial interpretation, and where the utility-acquisition project
of a municipality was directly implicated, would fall within the demarked
limits of lower court discretion.167 But since there was no such showing
of state law "unsettledness" in Mashuda, abstention there was clearly
erroneous. This level of analysis would synthesize the comity line of
precedent with the new "settled" law emphasis of Thibodaux and Mashuda
by recognizing comity and clarity as two prerequisite components circum-
scribing and directing trial court discretion. Where either is absent-no
state action is challenged, or the state law issue is enlightened by local
authority-abstention is categorically improper. Where the components
are present in degree, their assessment and balancing are for the district
judge.
perhaps- be assumed that Justice Stewart would vote with Justice Frankfurter; never-
theless, with the possible exception of Justice Whittaker the remainder of the Justices
appear to have rejected this position in the past. While it is true that Justice
Whittaker joined with Justice Brennan in Mashuda, he voted with the majority in
Thibodaux and did not, as did Justice Stewart, write a separate concurring opinion.
163 320 U.S. 228 (1943).
164 See 360 U.S. at 27 n.2. See also note 52 supra.
165 360 U.S. at 30.
166 360 U.S. 471 (1959). See notes 78-83 supra and accompanying text.
167 Mashuda would represent a clear case where if the district court determined
to abstain, its decision would be reversed. Thibodaux is perhaps the other extreme,
the slackest rein the Court would permit a district court in abstaining. The Harrison
line of cases falls midway between.
ABSTENTION
Closely associated with but distinct from this rationale of district
court discretion, another conception capable of incorporating Thibodaux
and Mashuda into the preexisting body of precedent involves analysis of
the posture of established state law with reference to the issue presented
for federal decision.'68 Under this approach, if, as in Mashuda and
Meredith, there can be found a considerable body of state authority which
the district court can directly apply to the facts or from which it can
reason or analogize in reaching a decision on the merits,16 9 then (unless no
decision at all is called for at the present) regardless of the lack of severity
of potential interference with state action, immediate federal decision will
be required. In the words of Justice Stewart, only "factual issues" here
remain to be resolved, 7 0 or, at most, issues demanding the application to
specific fact situations of previously developed general policy principles
originally established and patterned, in their wider dimensions, by state
adjudication. For this essentially deductive task the federal courts are as
well equipped as are the state courts themselves. Any risk that federal
decision on the merits would represent a "forecast" or an erroneous pre-
determination of state policy is here qualified by the necessarily limited im-
pact which a single concrete ruling can have in a field of law already largely
structured and delineated; and what risk there is, moreover, appears to be
more than offset by the countervailing risk of possible biased fact finding
or record distortion when an out-of-state party litigant is remitted to the
local courts. On the other hand, where there are no existing guide lines
for federal decision, where there obtains no body of state holdings whose
presence can both prevent the federal determination from running too wide
of the mark and, in context, restrict the potentially shaping effect of that
determination, here the initial case which is to open up a new, uncharted
area of state law and establish its primary premises should-if constitutional
issues or possibilities of interference with state action are involved-be
postponed until authoritative determination of state policy can be sought
from the state courts. Since only purely legal issues need be submitted for
state consideration, as in Thibodaux, the hazards here involved in giving the
state courts power to "make" federal facts seem slight as compared to the
correspondent hazards involved in giving the federal courts power to
"make" state law. Moreover, in such first instances, where basic lines of
political judgment will be laid that may be expected to carry over and
168 While the Court has spoken in terms of a "fact-law" distinction, this distinction
is not to be read in the traditional manner. "Fact!' would appear to include not only
matters of fact-finding but also the area in which, there being available closely perti-
nent or analogous state court decisions, the federal court need only exercise the
function of following these guide lines in arriving at the proper "legal" application in
the precise factual situation presented. In contrast, "law" would appear to refer to
those large areas of legal principle in which the major initial policy decisions, the
expression of basic value judgments in structures of comprehensive doctrine, remained
to be made.
169 In Meredith, the circuit court's plea of ignorance of Florida law was based
upon an apparent conflict between a set of recent Florida Supreme Court pronounce-
ments concerning municipal bond issues and an earlier line of decisions.
170 See note 159 supra.
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determine the general terms of subsequent development of the state law
in the area-law to be later applicable to in-state residents as well as out-
of-staters-there is perhaps less risk of discriminatory considerations in-
fluencing the local tribunal." And, of course, any further challenge to
inequality or unfairness premised upon the application, as contrasted to the
face provisions, of state statutory law would be triable in the federal courts
at a subsequent time.172 There appears to be sound reason, then, in a
principle which distinguishes Mashuda-involving issues of fact or of
established law in its application to specific fact-from Thibodaux-in-
volving issues of broad, unstructured basic legal principle. Though it may
be possible to view the holding in Thibodaux more broadly or more nar-
rowly,173 to do so would require, on the one hand, the overthrow of a con-
siderable body of precedent,174 on the other, the ignoring of an evident
evolution in the thinking of the Court.
SOME CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE
That diversity jurisdiction has been under increasing attack and that
a "distaste for diversity jurisdiction" has been evidenced in decisions of the
Court was noted in dissent in both Thibodaux1 75 and Martin v. Creasy.1
76
The bare fact remains, however, that Congress has consistently refused to
repeal this grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts; 177 whatever the
present validity of the reasons which support it, any serious undermining
of the jurisdiction, especially where only private parties are concerned,
would seem an unwarranted judicial invasion of the legislative function.
17 8
But once given this premise of the multitudinous diversity litigation in the
district courts, with its recurrent and inevitable host of determinative state
171 In cases like Thibodaux where foreign corporations are resisting a state's
attempt to expropriate their property, they should of course not be allowed to escape
whatever the local law may dictate indiscriminately for all persons of like posture,
whether domestic or foreign.
172 The issue at this point would be completely different: either an equal pro-
tection or a privileges and immunities question might be raised.
173 See Wright, The Abstention Doctrine Reconsidered, 37 TExAs L. REv. 815,
826 (1959). The writer characterizes the decision as perhaps "one of those instances
in which the judicial process with its inevitable compromise prevented clarity of
analysis and where decision turned on some concessions to cloudiness."
174 See notes 8-54 mipra and accompanying text.
175 360 U.S. at 41.
176 360 U.S. at 227.
177 Some restriction of diversity was accomplished when the jurisdictional amount
was recently raised from $3,000 to $10,000 and provisions redefining the citizenship
of corporations were adopted. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (Supp. 1959).
178 Different considerations are called into play when a state officer or a state
instrumentality appears as defendant in the federal action than when only private
parties are the contestants. It is plausible to argue that Congress in enacting the
diversity statute was primarily concerned with the prejudice that individuals might
encounter in the state courts, and where the state is, in fact, in one form or another
a party to the litigation the danger seems greater. Even more significantly, of course,
the countervailing consideration of potential disruption of state administrative pro-
grams, a nearly omnipresent consideration where the state's agencies are made de-
fendants in a federal district court, is very rarely involved in run-of-the-mill private-
party diversity cases. The whole historical development of the abstention doctrine,
in its non-constitutional aspect, is tied to cases immediately involving the functioning
of the organs of state government. The rationale of the doctrine appears to dictate
that it will remain so tied.
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ABSTENTION
law issues clear and unclear, it seems apparent that to impose the deterrents
of doubling costs and delays on the parties litigant merely for the sake of
some ideal of certainty and authoritativeness of federal decision, is to create
a hardship without benefits.1 7 9 Thus, to regard Thibodaux as a jumping off
point to the position that, regardless of the presence of constitutional ques-
tions or of problems concerning the states and their officials, the mere fact
of "unsettled" state law will alone justify abstention, not only runs counter
to all past precedent 180 but to the proper exercise of judicial authority
as well.
To view Thibodaux, however, either as an exercise of permitted trial
court discretion in a context of comity considerations and still unstructured
state law,18 1 or as representing a case in which the risk of federal distortion
of state policy overbalances all perceivable need for the safeguards of fed-
erally supervised procedures,' 8 2 not only saves the vitality of past precedent
in the area but would appear to have considerable normative merit on its
own. Granting that the courts as well as the legislature bear the burdens
of resolution of the many inherent conflicts in our federal system and, more
peculiarly, the duty to decide the individual conflict case when conflict is
inevitable, still the judicial construction and application of a doctrine that
will serve to avoid unnecessary conflicts would appear to be legitimate and
proper. Abstention where the functioning of state or local government
is challenged and where the relevant state policy determinations have not
yet been cast in structures of established law to guide the federal court's
decision, optimally serves this adjustive, preservative end. Even though
the recognition of discretionary powers in the lower courts may not produce
sharp lines confining and delimiting the circumstances of abstention, this
doctrinal unpredictability is of course less to be resisted in such matters
of procedure than in those areas of law upon which men in their daily
actions must rely. Absence of sharp lines, moreover, cannot be said to
burden courts and litigants with wasteful multiple appeals: the whole thrust
of a sharply defined area of lower court discretion is to discourage appeals
within that area itself. The discretionary principle, then, seems especially
appropriate as applied to the federal abstention doctrine; within it the dis-
trict courts will weigh, in the fact context of each case, all of the con-
siderations relevant to a striking of efficient federal balance. It is to be
hoped, therefore, that this is the sense in which Thibodaux will be read, and
that that case will not, rather-in pursuit of the ideal of authoritativeness
of each individual federal decision-be made a bridge to the application of
abstention to all cases of "unsettled" state law.
I. G. I.
179 Where constitutional questions are at issue or state functions are implicated
in the decision, on the other hand, the overriding public interest justifies the expense
and delay occasioned to the litigant who is being forced to take his case into several
different courts.
180 See notes 8-54 supra and accompanying text.
181 See notes 163-67 supra and accompanying text.
182 See notes 170-72 .mpra and accompanying text.
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